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 Part 2 
 Parliament: Select Committees 
and Internal Arrangements 

 *  This chapter draws on a much shorter piece co-written with Sarah Petit (in  C  Leston-Bandeira and 
 L  Thompson (eds)  Exploring Parliament ,  Oxford ,  OUP ,  forthcoming ). She is, of course, not responsible 
for my very different interpretations and conclusions. Of those I can name, I am grateful to Priscilla 
Baines, Robert Greally, Patrick O ’ Brien, Louise Thompson and the editors for their comments. 
 1  B  Cocks ,  Mid-Victorian Masterpiece :  The Story of an Institution unable to put its own House in order 
( London ,  Hutchinson ,  1977 ) . 
 2  ibid, 140. 
 3  House of Commons Governance Committee,  ‘ House of Commons Governance ’ , HC 297, 2014, 
5 ( ‘ the Straw Review ’ ). 
 4 
 The Governance of Parliament 
 BEN  YONG  *  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 GOVERNING PARLIAMENT HAS always brought challenges, but this has not always been recognised because of the focus on Parliament ’ s relation-ships with the other branches of government. In  Mid-Victorian Masterpiece , 1 
Sir Barnett Cocks, a former Clerk of the House, described the dawning realisation 
of a 1950s Commons select committee charged with examining accommodation: 
 They were beginning to learn that in a true parliamentary democracy such as that at 
Westminster, there was no offi cial with absolute authority, nobody wholly in charge and 
nothing to single out for condemnation except perhaps the inability of Members them-
selves to achieve what they wanted simply by acting collectively. They were not required 
themselves to do the work. All that was needed from them was an authorization of per-
haps four lines on a piece of paper to be tabled and voted on. It was something which, 
year after year, remained beyond the capacity of Members of all parties. 2 
 Cocks ’ book is ostensibly about the long process of designing and building the Pal-
ace of Westminster, and its management following construction. But the subtitle 
of the book — ‘ the story of an institution unable to put its own House in order ’ — is 
both literal and metaphoric. What Cocks was pointing to was the absence of lead-
ership within Parliament; and the diffi culty parliamentarians had — and continue 
to have — in acting collectively to protect  ‘ Parliament ’ (a term we must treat with 
some caution) and its long-term corporate interests. 
 This chapter is about the governance of the Westminster Parliament. 
Governance is about the structures through which the Houses of Parliament are 
each directed, controlled and led. 3 It is about leadership and administration: the 
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and the accountability of Government in the House of Commons ’ in  A  Horne and  A  Le Sueur (eds), 
 Parliament :  Legislation and Accountability ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2016 )  139, 144 – 148 . 
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 8  T  Moe and  S  Wilson , ‘ Presidents and Political Structure ’ ( 1994 )  57  Law and Contemporary Problems  1 ; 
 G  Loewenberg ,  On Legislatures: the Puzzle of Representation ( Boulder ,  Paradigm Publishers ,  2011 ) . 
internal control of each House, and (indirectly) how this affects the provision of 
resources and services to parliamentarians. Issues of parliamentary procedure are 
thus excluded. For similar reasons, we do not discuss select committees and the 
Backbench Business Committee. 4 Finally, the chapter does not deal specifi cally 
with members ’ pay, allowances and staffi ng: this has been dealt with, to some 
extent, in an earlier edition of this book. 5 
 House governance is a subject rarely covered in detail, because it appears 
to lack the raw excitement of law-making 6 and scrutiny of executive action. 7 
Examining how the Houses of Parliament govern themselves is important, 
because it can tell us about the weakness of the legislature as an institution, 
relative to the other branches of government. Managing a unique, structurally 
complex institution like Parliament is a form of public law. Moreover, looking 
at how Parliament organises and governs itself is a constitutional matter because 
the support and services to Parliament and its organisation is a necessary, but 
not suffi cient, condition to ensure it carries out its more obvious constitutional 
functions — legislating, scrutinising, authorising, representing, deliberating — in 
an effective manner. 
 The argument of this chapter is that governing Parliament is not easily 
 achievable — and that it is not necessarily or only the executive which hampers 
the effective working of a legislature. In the language of public choice, Parliament 
is a deeply complex organisation which has severe problems engaging in collec-
tive action. 8 The governance structures of both Houses refl ect this. They might 
be best understood as arrangements of key veto players, where each has the power 
of initiative but also the power to veto the decisions of the others. The result is, 
as one might expect, a situation in which the status quo is favoured and change, 
when it comes, is sporadic, driven by  ‘ exogenous ’ causes. The long-term corporate 
interests of Parliament — such as the capacity to organise itself to ensure a well-
supported legislature — are haphazardly addressed. 
 This chapter will proceed in the following fashion. Section II briefl y examines 
the framework through which the Westminster legislature has been viewed: the 
separation of powers. For the most part, Parliament has been viewed in terms 
of its relationships with the other branches — in particular, the Executive. In this 
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context, Parliament is regarded as a unitary entity; questions about its internal 
dynamics are marginalised or obscured. 
 Section III broadly sets out the peculiarity of Parliament as a public institution: 
it is expected to represent the polity, and as such members are nominal equals. 
This makes disagreement almost inevitable, and therefore collective action is par-
ticularly diffi cult. Sections IV and V — the bulk of this chapter — elaborate on this. 
These set out the governance arrangements in each House of Parliament, and then 
examine their history. This is followed by details of the dynamics of the key offi c-
ers and governance units of the two Houses, and the ways in which their organisa-
tion creates serious problems of collective action. Section VI returns to the present 
and looks at the Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster: a matter 
currently being debated in Parliament. 
 As Winetrobe has noted, the  ‘ closer one approaches the apex of the British 
political system, the more strict law gives way to  “ non-legal ” forms ’ . 9 The chapter ’ s 
primary sources are therefore the reports of the two Houses ’ governance bodies 
and various domestic committees. As the matters discussed in the various reports 
are sometimes opaque, and do not explain the political context and institutional 
dynamics of the issues raised, the chapter also draws on a small number of confi -
dential interviews and discussions carried out in 2016 – 17 with 15 individuals: fi ve 
who sat on the House of Commons Commission or on a domestic committee; 
fi ve who sat on the equivalent bodies in the House of Lords and fi ve senior clerks 
(three from the Commons; two from the Lords) on House governance. Interview-
ees were chosen on the basis of their previous or current role in House governance. 
 II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INTERNAL COMPLEXITY 
OF THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 
 The doctrine of the separation of powers sits explicitly or implicitly behind most 
discussions of the legislature. But in various ways it obscures some vital truths 
about how the legislature works. There are at least three conceptions of the doc-
trine: there is the  ‘ pure ’ separation of powers; the checks and balances conception; 
and the effi ciency conception. Most versions of the pure conception insist upon 
a strict connection between function, personnel and branch, and that functions 
and personnel in one branch should not overlap with another. Organising insti-
tutional power in this way avoids the concentration (and potential for abuse) of 
power. The checks and balances conception, on the other hand, does not require 
a rigid connection of functions and personnel to each branch — indeed, to some 
extent functions can be shared between branches. Its focus is on how each branch 
can check and balance the others. 10 The  ‘ effi ciency ’ conception allocates function 
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 11  NW  Barber ,  ‘ Prelude to the Separation of Powers ’ ( 2001 )  60  Cambridge Law Journal  59 . In more 
recent work, Barber has shifted from the term  ‘ effi ciency ’ to  ‘ suitability ’ :  NW  Barber ,  ‘ Self-Defence for 
Institutions ’ ( 2013 )  72  Cambridge Law Journal  558 . 
 12  eg  E  Carolan ,  The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern St ate ( Oxford ,  Oxford 
University Press ,  2009 ) and  A  Kavanagh ,  ‘ The Constitutional Separation of Powers ’ in  D  Dyzenhaus 
and  M  Thorburn (eds),  Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2016 )  221 . 
 13  Kavanagh,  ‘ The Constitutional Separation of Powers ’ (n 12) 222 – 223. 
 14  eg Winetrobe (n 7). 
 15  This view of Parliament is now being challenged:  M  Benton and  M  Russell ,  ‘ Assessing the Impact 
of Parliamentary Oversight Committees :  The Select Committees in the British House of Commons ’ 
( 2013 )  66  Parliamentary Affairs  772 ;  M  Russell and  P  Cowley ,  ‘ The Policy Power of the Westminster 
Parliament :  The  “ Parliamentary State ” and the Empirical Evidence ’ ( 2016 )  29  Governance  121 ; and 
 M  Russell ,  D  Gover and  K  Wollter ,  ‘ Does the Executive Dominate the Westminster Legislative Process ? 
Six Reasons for Doubt ’ ( 2016 )  69  Parliamentary Affairs  286 . 
 16  Kavanagh (n 12) 235. 
on the basis of institutional competence. 11 On this view, the importance of the 
doctrine lies more in ensuring effective government. 
 Yet, despite the dominance of the separation of powers as a framework to 
understand the branches of government, the general view of legal scholarship is 
that it has serious fl aws. 12 There are various objections. First, some conceptions 
are too stringent in insisting on a link between institution and function — that 
is, it is impossible to separate functions or even assign a core function to a par-
ticular branch of government. Second, it is diffi cult to reconcile a separation of 
powers with checks and balances, because the checking function would involve 
interference with the other branches. Third, the doctrine ignores the modern 
administrative state, in which some institutions exercise all three  ‘ core ’ functions 
of government. Finally, there are conceptual issues in defi ning the executive, judi-
cial and legislative functions, and what values inform the doctrine. 13 
 Yet the doctrine remains, and its persistence means that discussions of Parliament 
tend to be prefaced by the fusion of executive and legislature — and (what usually 
follows) various ways in which the executive dominates the legislature (or, at least, 
the House of Commons). 14 That is, the fusion of executive and legislature is said to 
hinder the latter in carrying out its proper constitutional functions. There is much 
truth in this, but it is not the entire story. 15 The doctrine, in most forms, is highly 
normative. In a recent survey of the separation of powers, for instance, Kavanagh 
argues that a philosophically justifi able conception of the doctrine must satisfy 
three criteria. The fi rst criterion is the desideratum of distinctness: it must show 
the distinctness of the branches without relying on essentialism of function. The 
second criterion is the desideratum of interaction: it must be able to account for 
the interaction and interdependence of branches. Finally, these desiderata must be 
underpinned by the joint enterprise of good government — ‘ coordinated institutional 
effort between branches of government in the service of good government. ’ 16 
 Thus we can see that the doctrine asks what would be desirable, and not what 
 ‘ is ’ — it marginalises the socio-political factors which may animate the action of a 
particular branch. It also looks outward to explain weakness. The emphasis on the 
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appropriate relationship between branches tends to treat them as if they were uni-
fi ed and coherent actors. 17  Inter -branch relationships are the focus:  intra -branch 
relationships are ignored. Moreover, the emphasis on interaction emphasises the 
operation of immunities (such as parliamentary privilege or judicial independ-
ence) or the exercise of power (legislative control over the budget, for instance, 
or judicial review). 18 But the internal coherence of the branch and its capacity to 
exercise these mechanisms or powers remains largely unexplored. 
 The importance of recognising internal complexity is better recognised in rela-
tion to the executive. Daintith and Page, for instance, noted long ago that at least 
one reason that the executive acts as it does, and is only weakly accountable to 
Parliament, is because of its institutional fragmentation. 19 In  ‘ core executive stud-
ies ’ the executive is often characterised as a set of actors operating in a context 
of resource scarcity. So, for instance, the Prime Minister is in some respects very 
weak, lacking a large staff or a department of their own, and must cooperate with 
Cabinet colleagues with far more impressive resources. 20 There is also the long-
standing issue about the appropriate relationship between political and adminis-
trative staff, and the extent of the latter ’ s duty to the former. 21 In such a context, 
clear, consistent and coherent development and implementation of policy become 
far more problematic. In short, we cannot take institutional unity for granted; and 
this potential lack of unity has implications for institutional action. 
 This chapter, then, is an attempt to apply this insight to the workings to the 
legislature. It is a study, not of privileges, immunities and powers, and their exer-
cise against external actors, but of administrative processes, and the interaction 
between political and administrative actors within the legislative branch. Looked 
at this way, a different picture of the legislature emerges: one in which the legisla-
ture is also hindered by its own internal organisation and dynamics. 
 III. THE PECULIAR NATURE OF PARLIAMENT 
 The 2014 Straw Review of the governance arrangements in the House of Commons 
stated: 
 Governance arrangements  … must enable an organisation to meet its primary 
purposes  … They must deliver clear decision-making, with a high degree of transparency 
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 22  Straw Review (n 3) 8 – 10. 
 23  I  Jennings ,  Parliament ,  2nd ed ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press ,  1957 )  2 . 
 24  Winetrobe (n 7) 19. 
 25  Loewenberg,  On Legislatures (n 8) 49. 
 26  G  Cox ,  ‘ The Organization of Democratic Legislatures ’ in  B  Weingast and  D  Wittman (eds),  The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Economy ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2009 )  141 . 
 27  T  Wright ,  ‘ Prospects for Parliamentary Reform ’ ( 2004 )  57  Parliamentary Affairs  867, 874 , quoted 
in M Russell and A Paun,  House Rules ? (n 7) 13. 
 28  eg, House of Commons Standing Order 14(1):  ‘ Government business shall have precedence at 
every sitting ’ . 
 29  In respect of legislation, there are usually three institutions constituting  ‘ Parliament ’ : the mon-
arch, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Here we leave the monarch aside. 
and clarity, whilst incorporating appropriate levels of oversight, challenge and effective 
personal accountability  … a clear governance structure would have at its apex a single 
governing body, containing both executive and non-executive roles, with a remit which 
defi nes what it is responsible for, and what it has delegated and to whom. 22 
 As we shall see, little of this has been present in Parliament. There are very good 
reasons for this. Jennings ’ observation that Parliament is a fi ction is a useful start-
ing point. 23 The term  ‘ Parliament ’ presumes that a legal entity with an autono-
mous and coherent personality, but this is constitutional shorthand, disguising 
considerable institutional complexity. 24 This stems from particular features of 
Parliament as a legislature, each of which require some explanation. 
 First, each House consists of members who are nominally equal: this makes it 
diffi cult to impose any kind of hierarchy. 25 This problem of  ‘ the legislative state 
of nature ’ 26 has been answered, for the most part, by the evolution of political 
parties (and to a lesser extent, by committees), but the focus of their collective 
action remains primarily on short-term, partisan goals. As Tony Wright noted of 
the House of Commons, 
 ‘ there is no Parliament, in that collective sense, to insist on anything. There are simply 
members of Parliament who have preoccupations and inhabit a career structure in which 
sustained strengthening of the institution is not a central priority. ’ 27 
 Second, there is the obvious institutional fact that in a Westminster parliamen-
tary system, the executive comes from, and exercises signifi cant infl uence over, the 
legislature. This is particularly clear in the House of Commons, where usually the 
Executive commands a majority. Executive infl uence penetrates almost every facet 
of parliamentary life: through formal means such as control over the agenda in the 
Commons; 28 and less formal but equally important means such as whipping and 
the promise of ministerial offi ce. 
 Third,  ‘ Parliament ’ is bicameral: it consists of the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords. 29 These are quite dissimilar institutions. The House of Commons 
has 650 elected MPs, who are more driven by immediate political concerns such 
as re-election, constituency interests, the party and the possibility of ministerial 
promotion than scrutinising legislation and executive action. By contrast, the 
Lords currently consists of over 800 peers, mostly appointed, with a rump of 
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 ‘ Membership and principal offi ce holders ’ at  www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-lords-faqs/
lords-members . 
 31  L Lawrence Smyth,  ‘ Privilege, Exclusive Cognisance and the Law ’ in Horne, Drewry and Oliver, 
 Parliament and the Law (n 5) 3. 
 32  See generally  J  Waldron ,  The Dignity of Legislation ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  1999 ) . 
 33  C  Leston-Bandeira ,  ‘ The Pursuit of Legitimacy as a Key Driver for Public Engagement: 
the European Parliament Case ’ ( 2014 )  67  Parliamentary Affairs  415, 421 . 
hereditary peers and bishops. Appointment, coupled with a much higher average 
age for peers (69, compared with 51 for MPs) means that not only are peers often 
individuals of expertise, but are also relatively immune to ambition. 30 Moreover, 
in the Lords, no one party or group has an overall majority. These two features 
diminish the infl uence of the Executive. In short, the two Houses do not speak 
with one voice; their respective members prioritise goals differently. 
 Fourth, and linked to the previous feature, each House is fi ercely protective of 
its own interests and privileges; and wary of changes which might affect its own 
autonomy and status. This stance was bolstered by the legal doctrine of exclusive 
cognisance, which gave each House the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate its own 
internal affairs without external interference. 31 In practice, however, the possibil-
ity that a House might act collectively means that successive administrations and 
governments in both Houses have been wary of acting on their behalf without fi rst 
seeking House consent. 
 Finally, and most importantly, the essence of legislatures is that they represent 
and contain disagreement. 32 They are riven by partisanship; disagreement is 
inevitable. Unlike almost any other organisation, there is no  ‘ common purpose ’ 
shared by those who work in Parliament. And in Parliament ’ s intensely political 
environment, and (in Westminster systems) because of its entanglement with the 
Executive, it is particularly diffi cult to divorce the corporate concerns of Parliament 
from partisan concerns. Parliament is the most political of all institutions, but the 
result is that its administration must act in a non-political way in order to respect 
all political allegiances. 33 
 These features refl ect the nature of Parliament as a legislature. The result of 
them is an institution that has found it very diffi cult to act in a coordinated, 
coherent manner where the issue is corporate — such as governance matters. These 
features also suggest that it is not a simple matter to import private and public 
sector arrangements into the two Houses. 
 At Westminster, the governance arrangements in each House refl ect the institu-
tional features just discussed. Broadly speaking, in each House, there is a political 
governance body, a Commission, consisting of key actors in the House (the pre-
siding offi cer, who usually chairs; the House Leaders of the parties; representa-
tion from the backbenches; and more recently, non-executive and staff members) 
which in principle provides strategic direction for services and administration 
in the House. It is in turn supported by the House Administration — permanent 
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 34  Note that as a result of the Straw Review, the administrative structure in the Commons is now 
different, with a Board which operates under a small Executive Committee: see Part IV below. 
 35  There are also domestic committees for procedure, privilege and conduct, but we are here only 
concerned with governance matters, not proceedings. 
 36  See, for instance, the current  ‘ Instrument of Delegation made by the House of Commons Com-
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commons/executive-committee/instrument-of-delegation . 
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House of Commons :  Services and Facilities ( London ,  George Allen  & Unwin ,  1983 ) and more recently, 
the excellent but as yet unpublished paper of P Baines,  ‘ House of Commons Governance: A Suitable 
Case for Treatment ? ’ (2017). 
House staff. The apex of House Administration is a board, which consists of 
House staff, and is chaired by the Clerk, the Accounting Offi cer of the House. 34 
The board implements the policies set by the governance body. The governance 
body is also supported by a set of domestic committees (so called because they 
deal with internal matters of house governance rather than matters external to the 
House), who advise on fi nances, services and administration. 35 These are com-
posed mostly of parliamentarians, and are a means through which the  ‘ custom-
ers ’ or  ‘ clients ’ (parliamentarians) of services are connected to the administrative 
(ie the management board) and political leadership (the Commission). And 
behind all of these arrangements lies the House itself. 
 But this formal (and oversimplifi ed) governance structure is inadequate if we 
wish to know how the Houses are governed, for underneath the formalities lies 
great ambiguity. Even the titles of key actors suggest confl icting jurisdictional 
claims: in the Commons, for instance, there is both a Speaker and a Leader of the 
Commons — who is leading or speaking for the House ? In practice, what mat-
ters are the relationships between actors: in particular, those between the House, 
government and the presiding offi cer (or the absence of a presiding offi cer, in the 
case of the Lords); the relationships within the Commission; and that between 
the Commission and Management Board. These relationships have been rarely 
expressed in the form of  ‘ law ’ — at best they may be found in instruments of del-
egation or memorandums of understanding, 36 but more often than not they take 
the form of sometimes stable, sometimes shifting practices or understandings, 
governed by personality. 
 IV. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
 To some extent, Parliament ’ s governance structures and the way in which 
responsibilities are allocated is the result of its relatively recent detachment from 
the executive. The  ‘ modern ’ history of House governance may be said to begin 
with the decision in 1965 to pass control over the Palace of Westminster to the 
two Houses. 37 In fact, the executive continued to play a signifi cant role in the 
management of the Houses. While day-to-day management of the Palace was 
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transferred to the two Houses ’ authorities, control over the upkeep of the Palace 
remained with the Department of the Environment. Control over staffi ng in the 
Commons remained formally lodged with the Commission for Regulating the 
Offi ces of the House of Commons, which consisted of the Speaker, the Secretary 
or Secretaries of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Master of the Rolls, the 
Attorney and Solicitor General. 38 
 Thus, the governance of the Commons remained under the Executive ’ s con-
trol, although in practice much was delegated to the Speaker and the Clerk 
of the House. The Speaker was advised on services in the Commons by the 
Services Select Committee, a domestic committee set up in 1965 and consisting 
of 20 members. It had no executive responsibility, but in practice, it assumed a 
number of executive functions. 39 
 Increasing dissatisfaction with the arrangements for House governance in the 
Commons led to a review by Sir Edward Compton ( ‘ the Compton Review ’ ), 40 
followed by the Bottomley Committee, 41 which reviewed and modifi ed the 
recommendations made by Compton. Both reviews noted that the governance 
arrangements for the House of Commons was unsatisfactory in various ways. 
The Compton Review had two primary recommendations: the abolition of the 
Commission appointed under the House of Commons (Offi ces) Act 1812 (with 
no replacement body); and the unifi cation of House administration — that 
is, permanent staff — under the Clerk of the House, following a civil service 
departmental model (primarily under the supervision of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer). The Bottomley Committee agreed to the fi rst in a qualifi ed manner, 
but not to the second: it was felt that the Compton Review ’ s key recommendations 
would  ‘ detract from the  “ self-governing ” role of the House ’ . 42 In relation to the 
fi rst recommendation, the Bottomley Committee recommended the replacement 
of the earlier Commission with a new House of Commons Commission ( ‘ the 
Commons Commission ’ ). The Committee stated that: 
 [W]e are convinced of the need, in the House of Commons, for an ultimate authority 
which can express the will of the House in respect of its own services, organisation and 
staff; which can provide a central thrust for the development of those services; and which 
can oversee and care for the interests of Members of all parties and where necessary 
represent those interests to the Executive. 43 
 This remains the objective of House governance today. The key (although not 
immediate) outcome of the Bottomley Committee was the establishment of the 
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Commons Commission by statute. 44 The Commission consisted of a broader 
mixture of parliamentary interests: the Speaker; the Leader; and Shadow Leader of 
the House, and backbenchers. The lack of an inbuilt majority would, in principle 
anyway, serve to insulate the Commission from the executive. It was primarily 
responsible for the recruitment, appointment and pay conditions of House staff, 
and for the preparation of fi nancial estimates for the House. 45 In terms of House 
administration, a Board of Management was established, but on the whole its 
organisation remained very much as before, on the basis that it was not delivering 
a singular policy but rather services to a set of actors. 
 These changes did not result in a more coherent, strategic approach to 
governance. 46 Following the Bottomley Committee there were a series of reviews 
of House governance carried out at relatively regular intervals, all done by exter-
nal consultants: Sir Robin Ibbs (1990); Michael Braithwaite (1999); and Sir Kevin 
Tebbit (2007). 47 The fi rst of these, the Ibbs Review, is perhaps the most signifi cant, 
because later reviews built on its objectives. The Ibbs Review described an organi-
sation in which the governing political body (the Commons Commission) rarely 
made decisions, and when it did, did so in a non-transparent manner. Moreover, 
it remained unclear who determined policy for services, or for implementation of 
policy. This was partly because the Services Select Committee presumed it had an 
executive role in producing policy, and yet its formal remit was advisory — and that 
it advised the Speaker, not the Commission. 
 The Ibbs Review also described an administration which was highly unsat-
isfactory: it had very limited capacity to monitor — let alone control — fi nancial 
matters. So, for instance, spending was covered by seven different votes, of which 
only two were within the remit of Commons authorities. There was simply no 
readily usable fi nancial information or comprehensive budgets; and no profes-
sional fi nancial advice available. The Review concluded:  ‘ A complete overhaul of 
fi nancial systems is an inescapable necessity ’ . 48 It was only through establishing 
fi nancial control over the administration of the Commons (including estates and 
works) that it could function as a modern public sector organisation. 
 The Ibbs Review led to a number of changes. 49 On the political side, the key 
domestic committee, the Services Committee was abolished and replaced with 
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a smaller Finance and Services Committee to reduce ambiguity of roles. On the 
administrative side, various reforms were put in place: a clearer remit was set for 
the Management Board; greater fi nancial management mechanisms and resources 
were provided. The Review also led to the enactment of the Parliamentary Cor-
porate Bodies Act 1992, which established the Clerks as the corporate offi cers of 
the two Houses. This allowed the Clerk of each House to enter into private sector 
arrangements; and was a necessary condition for full control over the Palace and 
the surrounding parliamentary estate to be transferred to the two Houses ’ author-
ities. That this only happened at the end of the twentieth century is testament to 
the lack of interest in House governance issues on the part of parliamentarians. 
 Both the Braithwaite (1999) and Tebbit (2007) Reviews were primarily taken 
up with modernising and streamlining the management of House administration. 
The Braithwaite Review recommended the establishment of an Audit Committee 
and the creation of an Offi ce of the Clerk to support the Clerk ’ s increasing mana-
gerial role. The Tebbit Review recommended a streamlined Board of Management 
(later Management Board), a strengthened Offi ce of the Clerk, and the sharing of 
Estates and Works. 
 All three reviews identifi ed perennial problems in both the political and admin-
istrative wings of Commons governance. Each review repeated the same criticisms: 
the Commons Commission lacked transparency, and generally failed to provide 
strategic direction on House services and administration; its relationships with 
both the Management Board and the domestic committees were ambiguous; and 
there was a lack of clarity about who was responsible for determining policy and 
implementation. In spite of this, the Commons Commission remained unchanged 
in shape, function and approach. 
 By contrast, House administration underwent several reforms, in order to meet 
the manifold and multiplying service demands of members. In time, the reviews 
resulted in the modernisation and centralisation of House administration; and in 
doing so consolidated administrative and managerial power in the Commons in 
the offi ce of the Clerk of the House, effectively making the offi ceholder the chief 
executive of all House staff. This was perhaps an inevitable development, given the 
rise in number of staff working for the House of Commons. In 1979, House staff 
numbered 550 full time staff; by 2014 well over 1700. 50 
 The 2014 Straw Review was signifi cant in being the fi rst review of Commons 
governance arrangements by members themselves in 40 years (since the 1975 
Bottomley Review), which just illustrates the diffi culty in getting parliamentarians to 
think about governance issues. As one MP stated to the Straw Committee,  ‘ People 
do not become Members of Parliament because they want to run the House of 
Commons ’. 51 Indeed, the establishment of the Review came about, not because of a 
desire to reform House governance, but from an elixir of particular, contingent events. 
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 In early 2014, Sir Robert Rogers, then Clerk of the House, announced his retire-
ment. The post of Clerk is a Crown appointment — a measure of protection for the 
independence of the offi ce, since the Clerk is the chief procedural adviser to the 
Speaker and the House. In theory, then, the Clerk is appointed by the monarch on 
the advice of the Prime Minister. In practice, however, this has been done follow-
ing a selection process determined mostly by the Speaker, with the Commission 
having a much less defi ned role. This informal division of labour has taken place 
because the Speaker operationally relies very heavily upon the Clerk, and therefore 
has a necessary and more immediate interest in the appointment. 
 Carol Mills, then an Australian parliamentary offi cial, was announced as Sir 
Robert ’ s successor. It was, however, later revealed that Mills lacked procedural 
experience, and was under investigation for misleading an Australian parliamen-
tary committee over a possible breach of parliamentary privilege. The selection 
process was also criticised as procedurally fl awed. 52 This allowed some mem-
bers to launch an attack on the incumbent Speaker, John Bercow MP, who was 
seen as having increased the power of the Commons relative to the Government. 
The appointment process was  ‘ paused ’ (and ultimately an internal candidate was 
appointed), and an ad hoc committee chaired by Jack Straw MP was established to 
consider  ‘ the governance of the House of Commons, including the future alloca-
tion of the responsibilities for House services currently exercised by the Clerk of 
the House and Chief Executive ’ . 53 
 It is unclear why the terms of reference were drafted so broadly, given the par-
ticular political context from which it emerged. It meant, however, that the Com-
mittee was able to examine and address various long-standing issues of House 
governance — in particular, the lack of strategic direction; and poor relationships 
between the political and administrative wings of the House. 54 The Review noted, 
in a passage redolent of any description of most aspects of the UK ’ s constitution: 
 The governance arrangements for the House have developed over time often in response 
to particular issues or events. This has resulted in a situation where the complexities 
which are inherent in the character of the House as a legislature have been compounded 
by layers of interventions which have built on and adapted what went before rather than 
rationalising or restructuring it. 55 
 Two external members, an additional backbench representative and two offi cial 
members (the Clerk and a Director General) were added to the Commission; and 
the Commission now had a specifi c statutory duty to set strategic priorities for 
House services. 56 The rationalisation of House administration continued apace. 
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A Director General ( ‘ DG ’ ) responsible for delivery of services, working under the 
Clerk, was appointed. 57 An Executive Committee ( ‘ ExCo ’ ), consisting of the Clerk, 
DG and Head of Corporate Services was established. ExCo provides support to 
the Commission and is an intermediary level body between the Commission and 
a Board far more operational than the previous management board. Finally, the 
appointment process for the Clerk was clarifi ed, to some extent: the Straw Review 
recommended it follow modern recruitment practices for public appointments —
 that is, it should be open and competitive; and the full selection process should be 
agreed to and overseen by the Commission. 58 
 The key changes brought about by the Straw Review are too recent to evaluate. 
On the  ‘ political ’ side, the non-executive and offi cial members have no vote, but 
the external perspective which they provide may prompt action. The additional 
backbench member will increase representativeness, and reduce the likelihood of 
the government enjoying a majority on the Commission (as it had under the coa-
lition Government). 59 But this additional member only reinforces the Commis-
sion ’ s fundamental decision-making rule: consensus. 
 In terms of clarifying the selection process for the Clerk, it seems unlikely 
to remove the tension between the Clerk ’ s responsibility to the incumbent 
Speaker and to the House as a whole. On the administrative side, the division of 
labour between the Clerk of the House and the new DG may alleviate pressures 
on the Clerk, but this will depend greatly on the relationship between the two 
offi ce-holders. This relationship will also determine whether ExCo will be effective 
or not. 
 More generally, however, the Straw Review and its provenance illustrate the 
classic problems of House governance: grey and undocumented arrangements; 
ambiguous relationships between political and administrative staff; struggles for 
institutional power entangled with partisan politics; and ultimately, change to 
governance arrangements sparked not by the need for rationalisation or effi ciency, 
but by sometimes quite personal confl ict. 
 A. Key Actors in House of Commons Governance 
 It is useful at this point to step back and examine more closely the key actors 
involved in House governance, and their dynamics. This will allow us to see the 
ways in which governance is  ‘ in fact ’ exercised, and under what conditions. 
 The House of Commons Commission is the most important governance body 
within the Commons, responsible for both the management of House fi nances 
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and personnel. 60 For most of its existence the Commons Commission consisted 
primarily of politicians: the Speaker; the Leader of the House; a member nomi-
nated by the Opposition Leader (usually the Shadow Leader of the House); and 
three senior backbench members — one from each of the main parties (and since 
2015 another to represent the remaining membership). It has, then, been broadly 
representative of the House, with the government enjoying no inbuilt majority. 
This has provided the Commission with insulation from the executive, but it 
also draws the Commission closer to the  ‘ legislative state of nature ’ . It operates by 
consensus, 61 which in practice has been diffi cult to achieve. Inertia is the default 
position. 
 The Speaker is the most important actor within the Commission. Within the 
House, he has a dual role: he is the presiding offi cer in the Commons, and so 
resolves issues of procedure; but he is also responsible for the day-to-day adminis-
tration of the House. 62 The authority that the Speaker derives from being presiding 
offi cer bleeds into his administrative role. As Chair of the Commons Commission, 
the Speaker sets the agenda; he is the actor who spends the longest time in post on 
the Commission (between 1979 and 2015, Speakers spent an average of eight years 
in post) 63 and who deals with senior House staff on a day-to-day basis. Many of 
the Commission ’ s functions have devolved or been delegated to him — in particu-
lar, the power of appointment. 64 
 Speakers, however, tend to lack the temperament, expertise and time for 
management and strategic direction of how the House is run. Like most MPs, 
Speakers have rarely had managerial experience, so they face similar diffi culties to 
parliamentarians thrust into a ministerial role; 65 they also have their procedural 
responsibilities, and constituency duties as all MPs do. Thus, Speakers can be 
enormously infl uential in House governance, but like many ministers, have a 
tendency to focus on the short term. They are also constrained by other key actors 
within the governance structure of the House; and tempered by the need to maintain 
their own neutrality. Thus, the Straw Review noted that the Speaker has  ‘ a position of 
leadership within the House, without being fully in charge ’ . 66 
 The Leader of the House can be a powerful actor in terms of House adminis-
tration: the Ibbs Review, for instance, was established in the wake of Sir Geoffrey 
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Howe ’ s brief tenure as Leader on the Commission; 67 and modernisation of the 
Commons (mostly in terms of procedure) took place under Robin Cook. However, 
Leaders have a dual role: they are expected to ensure that the legislative agenda of 
the Government is met in the Commons, as well as representing the House where 
appropriate. Almost inevitably, the former role dominates over the latter. The rare 
Leader committed to reform faces formidable challenges, not least from their own 
whips and an indifferent to hostile Prime Minister. 68 Leaders tend to be members 
on their way down, rather than up, which can restrict their infl uence. The Lead-
er ’ s Offi ce has very small resources (with a staff in the twenties, compared to the 
thousands who staff the large Whitehall departments). 69 Tenure for Leaders of the 
House is low: between 1979 and 2017, the average time in offi ce was two years. 70 
 A similar analysis applies to the Shadow Leader of the House, whose average 
time in post is even shorter: 1.5 years in the same period. 71 To a large extent, then, 
the Leader (and the opposition ’ s counterpart) acts as a veto player, and only rarely 
exercises any power of initiative. Backbench members of the Commission — 
chosen by the Whips — have tended to support the status quo. Although one 
member is Chair of the Finance Committee, backbench members as a group have 
lacked the institutional authority of the Speaker or the Leaders. 72 Finally, we need 
note that the Leader and Shadow Leader are part of another set of key actors —
 the  ‘ usual channels ’ , who prefer — all things considered — the status quo. The usual 
channels are also responsible for the appointment of the backbench members of 
the Commission, and those who sit on the domestic committees. 73 
 Broadly, then, the Commons Commission, composed primarily of politicians 
with multiple, confl icting priorities, and having a high turnover, is predisposed 
towards inaction on issues with long-term implications. This is compounded 
by members ’ fear of negative publicity, which prompts them against action. At 
the same time, however, being composed of politicians, the Commission has the 
tendency to be reactive, focusing on routine matters and the short term. In this 
respect, it is often the Speaker who dominates, because of a lack of focused engage-
ment from the other actors. 
 The domestic committees were established as a means by which concerns about 
administration and governance could be  ‘ fed up ’ to permanent House staff and to 
the Commission. Chairs and members of the domestic committees remain chosen 
via party whips and the usual channels. 74 There has long been confusion over 
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the jurisdictional boundaries between the domestic committees, the Commons 
Commission and the Management Board. Committees have often thought of 
their role as executive in nature, whereas committee terms of reference have long 
stated that their function is advisory. Moreover, absenteeism and turnover in these 
committees has traditionally been high. 
 Thus, House governance have often fallen by default on the shoulders of the 
administrative wing — that is to say, on House staff and the Management Board. 
The board has traditionally supported the Commons Commission and imple-
mented its decisions. However, the relationship between the Commission and the 
Board (and House staff) is complicated, for two key reasons. These complications 
are inherent in all public bureaucracies, although the legislative context adds a 
unique twist. 
 The fi rst is the tendency towards compartmentalisation (like  ‘ siloism ’ in the 
executive), which plagues all organisations. 75 House administrative organisation 
has, for much of its existence, lacked unity because of the functional specialisation 
of House staff: for decades House services had a federal structure with the Clerk of 
the House operating as  primus inter pares , but who shared administrative control 
with powerful department heads such as the Serjeant-at-Arms. Thus, until the late 
1990s we have seen that the Board acted as  ‘ a forum for discussion and compromise, 
rather than for strategy and decision. ’ 76 It was not a  ‘ supra-departmental ’ body 
that acted collectively. The various consolidations brought about by successive 
reviews, however, have now made the Board and House administration far more 
cohesive, but concerns about coordination persist. 77 
 But there is a more fundamental tension lying at the heart of the relationship 
between the political wing and the permanent House administration: the consti-
tutional (and prudent) necessities for permanent staff to be  both responsive  and 
politically impartial. House staff must be responsive to each and every member, 
but balance this with their responsibility to the House as a corporate entity which 
exists across time. So, for instance, the Clerk of the House is responsible to the 
Speaker and the Commission, but he is also Accounting Offi cer for the House, 
responsible for the proper use of public money. 78 Navigating between the twin 
necessities of responsiveness and impartiality can be diffi cult: in the intensely 
political environment of the Commons,  ‘ acts undertaken as impartial manage-
ment initiatives can quickly assume unintended political signifi cance ’ . 79 
 Indeed, this duty of political impartiality, or perhaps constrained responsive-
ness, takes on a special importance in a legislative context: it is not always clear 
who the legitimate representative of  ‘ the House ’ is. Ultimately, civil servants in a 
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department can turn to their Secretary of State as representative of the department 
to resolve a thorny issue. Not so for House staff. As we have seen, they generally 
have no identifi able  ‘ leader ’ in the way that civil servants have. The Commission 
is legally their employer (although management is delegated to the Board), but 
in practice, political authority is not often forthcoming, or comes from a some-
what imperfect representative, the Speaker. House staff are expected to be politi-
cal impartial and loyal to the vague entity that is  ‘ the House ’ (and noticeably, not 
Parliament). 80 For all these reasons, permanent staff are less wont to act, or act in 
a manner which can frustrate those on the Commission, the domestic committees 
and members generally. What Kaufman said of politico-administrative relations 
in an executive context is equally true in a legislative context: 
 [T]he system is so loaded with ambiguity that what looks like wilful insubordination and 
evasion from one standpoint may seem like defensible and even dutiful behavior from 
another. It is diffi cult to be sure which is which because of the plethora of commands. 81 
 Political impartiality acts as a necessary shield for staff in the face of competing 
and confl icting partisan demands, but it can result in apparent inaction or a stud-
ied passivity. It may be no surprise, therefore, that relations between the political 
and administrative wings of House government are not always sweetness and light. 
 This brings us on to the House itself, which all key actors recognise as  ‘ sovereign ’ . 
It rarely intervenes in governance matters in a decisive way. This is partly because 
its composition is constantly changing, but at every election: between 1979 and 
2015 the average turnover following each general election was roughly a quarter 
of the House. 82 With such a turnover,  ‘ its ’ institutional memory and willingness 
to address long-term governance issues is very limited. 83 That said, the history of 
Commons governance illustrates that successive Commissions and governments 
have been wary of acting without fi rst seeking the House ’ s views and consent. 
 The result of this tangled state of affairs is that changes in governance have come 
about slowly; or abruptly changed following an exogenous  ‘ shock ’ to the system. 
 V. THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 Limited space allows for only a brief examination of the governance structure in 
the Lords, but it provides a useful comparator for the Commons. 84 For the most 
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part, the dynamics in the Lords replicate those in the House of Commons, but 
the Lords ’ arrangements have been much less formal in nature, and far slower to 
change. This has been primarily due to the Lords ’ unelected, subordinate status 
within Parliament — for most of the twentieth century there was little internal or 
external pressure to reform governance arrangements. 85 The focus of political and 
public attention has been primarily on reforming the composition of the Lords, 
not its inner workings. The result was that for decades House services in the Lords 
were run in a semi-autonomous fashion by permanent staff, with limited over-
sight by members. 
 The primary catalysts for change in House governance in the Lords have been 
exogenous — that is to say, sparked by factors external to the House: changes to 
governance arrangements in the  ‘ other place ’ ; and the removal of most hereditary 
peers in 1999, shifting the composition of the House towards appointed peers; 
and increasing numbers of life and working peers appointed by successive Prime 
Ministers. The last catalyst in particular has put pressure on scarce resources in the 
House, encouraging greater rationalization of governance structures. 86 
 The  ‘ modern ’ governing arrangements for the Lords begins with the 2002 
Tordoff Review. 87 The Review had been established in the wake of the Commons ’ 
1999 Braithwaite Review. A major reason for the Tordoff Review was to evaluate 
the administrative fi nancial mechanisms put in place in the Lords following Ibbs, 
but equally as important was the dissatisfaction of peers with the then current 
governance arrangements — ‘ there was a prevailing sense that the system [had] 
failed  … [and] a widespread distrust of the existing system ’ . 88 
 The Tordoff Review was scathing. It bluntly stated the Select Committee on 
the House of Lords Offi ces (then the functional equivalent of the Commons 
Commission) was dysfunctional. It consisted of an extraordinary 28 members, 
including the Chairman of Committees; the Leaders, Deputy Leaders, Chief Whips 
of the three main parties, the Convenor of the Crossbenchers; and the chairs of 
all the  ‘ domestic ’ subcommittees. 89 The lack of clearly defi ned responsibilities, 
and the size and organisation of the Offi ces Committee meant that it acted as 
a  ‘ post box ’ for decisions made by its various subcommittees (the equivalent of 
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domestic committees). The Review ’ s evaluation of the political wing of the Lords ’ 
governance arrangements strikes a familiar note: 
 The size of the Offi ces Committee, the infrequency of its meetings, and the way issues 
reach it, all mean that it is incapable of providing leadership for the domestic administra-
tion of the House. It does not develop a coherent strategy or set an agenda for the more 
specialised Sub-Committees and for the administration as a whole. In the absence of 
such leadership the Sub-Committees are reactive — they respond to proposals put before 
them and rarely take a strategic view of the requirements of the House and how to meet 
them. This has a knock-on effect on staff: without political guidance from the Commit-
tee structure, the staff prepare papers for Sub-Committee meetings which concentrate 
on specifi c proposals or particular complaints, rather than medium or long-term policies 
for improving the administration of the House as a whole. 90 
 In short, the need to ensure representation (and therefore the requirement of con-
sensus) replicated the legislative state of nature and paralysed effective governance. 
Moreover, the lack of leadership and clearly defi ned responsibilities within the 
Lords meant that the Lords could neither assert itself in relation to the Commons, 
nor engage in meaningful discussion about shared services. Thus we can see that 
organisation and institutional arrangements matter: the absence of a clear, hier-
archical governance structure meant that the Lords was hampered in its capacity 
to carry out its basic constitutional functions — or even seek clarity on what these 
functions might be. 
 On the administrative side, there was again a familiar refrain. The Tordoff 
Review pointed out that there was no centralised management board to provide 
support to the Offi ces Committee on strategy or a business plan — there were 15 
administrative offi ces (compared with the fi ve departments in the Commons). 
Given this fragmentation it was diffi cult for the administration to provide focused 
support to the Offi ces Committee. 
 The Tordoff Review made a number of recommendations which were mostly 
implemented. The Offi ces Committee was replaced with a relatively smaller House 
Committee of 12 peers, which was expected to provide leadership and policy 
direction for House administration. The subcommittees were reconstituted as 
domestic committees. Their primary role was to advise the House Committee; 
and to act as  ‘ user groups ’ to allow peers to discuss House services. An Audit 
Committee with external members and a management board were established. 
Thus, governance arrangements were rationalised, with power explicitly centralised 
within the House Committee. 
 Between the 2002 Tordoff Review and the 2016 Shephard Review (see below), 
there were a series of reviews. The 2007 Parker Review 91 mostly focused on House 
administration: the Management Board was regarded as reactive and responding to 
the short-term and the routine. It recommended the appointment of non-executive 
94 Ben Yong
 92  This was rejected by the Tordoff-Hunt Review: House of Lords House Committee,  ‘ Internal 
Governance ’ H/07-08/1, 2007. This was chaired by Lord Tordoff and Lord Hunt of Wirral. 
 93  ibid. 
 94  M  Thomas and  A  Makower ,  ‘ Report of a Review of the Structure of the House of Lords Adminis-
tration and the Operation of the Management Board ’ ( 2011 ) . 
 95  Select Committee on the Speakership of the House,  ‘ The Speakership of the House of Lords ’ , 
HL 92, 2005. 
 96  Thus, when Lord Sewell (then Chairman of Committees, 2012 – 15) abruptly left the House of 
Lords following a scandal, it was initially unclear who was responsible for managing the aftermath. 
members to the Board. 92 The 2007 Tordoff-Hunt Review, 93 on the other hand, focused 
primarily on the political side of governance. It concluded that the governance 
structures needed only incremental tweaking — in particular, tighter terms of reference 
and better relationships between the House Committee, management board and the 
domestic committees. The 2011 Thomas and Makower Review 94 returned to issues 
of administration, recommending a smaller Management Board, a non-executive 
element, rationalisation and reduction in the number of free-standing administrative 
offi ces, and greater support to the Offi ce of the Clerk of the Parliaments. 
 Reading all reviews more closely, however, it is clear that while the  ‘ excesses ’ 
of the pre-Tordoff years had ended, fundamental problems remained. The 
political wing failed to provide leadership, remained unable to decide, or focused 
on routine matters at the expense of thinking more long term; while the House 
administration remained mostly reactive, limited by the passivity of the political 
wing and the continued fragmentation of its services, which were organised along 
both functional and task lines. 
 By far the most public change to House governance in this period was the 
establishment of the Lord Speaker in 2005, which resulted from Prime Minister 
Blair ’ s decision to  ‘ reform ’ the post of Lord Chancellor. Here was an opportunity to 
address the absence of a Commons-style Speaker, a fi gure to whom administrative 
concerns could also be directed. The House, however, was concerned that a 
Commons-style Speaker would upset the principle of self-regulation. Thus, what 
was created only served to blur the lines of accountability within the Lords, with 
the Lord Speaker ’ s functions and duties carved out from the existing duties of the 
Lord Chancellor and the Chairman of Committees. 95 The Lord Speaker was an 
elected post, the public face of the Lords, and Chair of the House Committee; but 
at the same time the Lord Speaker had little connection with the administrative 
staff of the House, except in matters of security. The Chairman of Committees 
(on whom, see more below) remained the key link between peers and the 
administration. Thus, there is now a triumvirate of offi cers with vested roles in 
administration and governance: the Lord Speaker, the Chairman of Committees 
and (to a lesser extent) the Leader of the Lords. This diffusion of functions has 
meant a lack of clarity over responsibility for governance. 96 
 In 2016 the Leader ’ s Group on Governance published a report (the  ‘ Shephard 
Review ’ , named after the Group ’ s chair) recommending various changes to 
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governance. 97 The Review stems from various incidents demonstrating that the 
current arrangements had become unsustainable; the 2014 Straw Review; and 
more broadly, because of anxiety about increasing public and media scrutiny, 
the pressures on resources brought about by increasing numbers of appointed 
peers; and the impending Restoration and Renewal programme of the Palace of 
Westminster (see below). 
 The Shephard Review ’ s recommendations were mostly accepted by the 
House. 98 The House Committee — renamed the House of Lords Commission ( ‘ the 
Lords Commission ’ ) — was now explicitly responsible for the strategic direction 
of House services. The Lords Commission remained 12 in number, but two 
backbench members were replaced by two non-executive members to provide an 
external challenge. The key domestic committees were reduced in number, with 
new Finance and Services Committees advising the Commission. Clearer terms of 
reference for all committees and the Commission were set down. The Chairman 
of Committees would no longer sit as  ex offi cio chair of either the new Finances 
or Services Committees. As a result, the Lords ’ governance structure — particularly 
the House Commission and domestic committees — now neatly mirrors the 
arrangements in the Commons. This was deliberate, and may allow the two Houses 
to work together in a more coherent fashion, particularly given Restoration and 
Renewal. 
 A. Key Actors in House of Lords Governance 
 If we once again step back to examine the dynamics between the key actors, we 
see a similar picture to the Commons. The primary difference is that underlying 
House governance is the absence of a government majority: this makes the crite-
rion of consensus even more critical. 
 The Lords Commission is the key political body in relation to governance 
matters. It suffers from the same defects as its Commons counterpart: it is a body of 
limited capacity and effectiveness because of its composition and decision-making 
process. It is almost twice as large as the Commons Commission, consisting of 
12 members: the Lords Speaker (and prior to 2005, the Lord Chancellor); the 
Chairman of Committees; the leaders of the Conservatives, Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats; the Convenor of the Crossbench Peers; four backbench peers; 
and, as of 2016, two non-executive members. Unlike its Commons counterpart, 
however, the Lords Commission and its predecessors have had no statutory basis; 
its existence has depended on the will of the House. 
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 Within the Commission itself, the key actors are the Lord Speaker, the Leaders 
and the Chairman of Committees, and more broadly, the usual channels. Prior 
to the establishment of the Lord Speaker, it was the Lord Chancellor who had a 
quasi-presiding offi cer function, who sat by dint of that role in the Offi ces Com-
mittee (later the House Committee). However, the Lord Chancellor was notorious 
for the number of hats held — as titular head of the judiciary, Cabinet minister and 
quasi-presiding offi cer of the Lords. Although the average time in post between 
1979 and 2007 was fi ve and a half years, 99 the burdens of this offi ce (primarily 
judicial work prior to the Constitution Reform Act 2005) meant that the adminis-
tration of the House was a low priority for successive Lord Chancellors. 
 We have already discussed the Lord Speaker. Although offi ce-holders are elected, 
and would seem to have an independent source of authority, it is a new offi ce, and 
its functions are primarily directed outwards rather than internally. Offi ce-holders 
have had limited connection with the administrative staff of the House, except in 
matters of security. 
 Instead, it has been the Chairman of Committees 100 who has been the key link 
between peers and the administration. Chosen via the Committee of Selection 
(that is, by the usual channels), and expected to maintain a non-partisan stance, 
the Chairman exercises the effective equivalent of the Speaker ’ s administrative role 
by dint of his role as  ex offi cio chair of key domestic committees, 101 his offi ce ’ s 
physical proximity to key House staff and long periods of tenure. 102 It was for 
these reasons that the 2002 Tordoff Review recommended the Chairman should 
provide leadership as the chair of the Lords Commission ’ s predecessor, the House 
Committee. 103 
 Leaders of the Lords suffer from similar problems to their Commons 
counterparts. They have divided responsibilities, and historically they have 
not stayed for long in offi ce: they have had a tenure similar to their Commons 
counterparts (2.3 years in the period 1979 – 2017). 104 Moreover, in the past they 
shared the authority of government with another government minister, the Lord 
Chancellor. To the extent, then, that there is leadership in the Lords, it is exercised 
unevenly, mediated through several veto players. The Leaders (and formerly the 
The Governance of Parliament 97
 105  House of Lords ,  Staff Handbook ( 2012 ) , para 12.1. 
 106  Emma Crewe argues that many of the recommendations of the Tordoff Committee were the 
work of clerks:  E  Crewe ,  Lords of Parliament ( Manchester ,  Manchester University Press ,  2005 ),  175 . 
 107  Thomas and Makower,  House of Lords (n 94) 22. 
 108  eg,  House  of Lords ,  Companion to the Standing Orders and Guide to the Proceedings of the House 
of Lords ,  25th edn ( 2017 ),  47 . 
Lord Chancellor) are all members of the usual channels, and along with the party 
Whips are mostly likely to exercise their infl uence in favour of the status quo. The 
Lord Speaker, Chairman of Committees and the Convenor of the Crossbenchers 
are expected to be non-partisan and must therefore tread carefully. And, as in 
the Commons, all key political actors are constrained by the fear of negative 
publicity. 
 From our brief historical overview, we have seen that House administration in 
the Lords have gone through similar changes to those in the Commons (indeed, 
much of it driven by those changes): a slow process of rationalisation, with a par-
ticular emphasis on fi nancial management. House staff in the Lords are also in a 
similar invidious position to staff in the Commons: they are expected to be politi-
cally neutral, and yet they may be understood as the  ‘ stewards ’ of the House (and 
again, not to the notional entity,  ‘ Parliament ’ ). 105 The result has been a mixture 
of deferential behaviour and frustrated attempts to press peers towards greater 
 modernisation. 106 Noting the absence of direction from the political wing — a 
 ‘ strategic vacuum ’ — one review of House administration commented that 
 offi cers will usually attempt to plug critical gaps of thinking. But the relationship is frag-
ile, and extends only to certain topics. This is one of the reasons why parliaments have 
tended to lag behind even the broader public sector in their adoption of new working 
methods. 107 
 Finally, there is the House itself. In the Lords the infl uence of the House is subtly 
stronger — this is particularly so in the twenty-fi rst century, as the government 
enjoys no majority in the Lords. The corollary of this, however, is that a cross-
party consensus is necessary to achieve change. The quasi-constitutional status 
of the principle of  ‘ self-regulation ’ , which underlies the everyday operations of 
the Lords, is testament to this. 108 Self-regulation, however, tends to translate 
into a fear that new structures or reforms will interfere with or undermine that 
much-vaunted principle — as was the case with the establishment of the Lord 
Speaker. 
 The governance landscape in the Lords is therefore what the Commons 
governance arrangements would have been, but for the far more intense public 
and political pressures put on the Commons, and the presence of a government 
majority. In the Lords, there is an even greater dispersal of accountability — for 
instance, the equivalent functions of the Commons Speaker are shared between 
three different actors in the Lords. The reforms adopted have usually mirrored 
those in the Commons, but have taken longer to be accepted by the House. 
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The House itself has been somewhat more interventionist in governance matters, 
but not necessarily in a positive fashion. 109 
 VI. RESTORATION AND RENEWAL 
 In this fi nal section we return, full circle, to the subject matter and themes of 
 Mid-Victorian Masterpiece , with the recent debate over the restoration and renewal 
( ‘ R & R ’ ) of the Palace of Westminster. 110 We shall not delve into all the details of 
R & R here, given its complexity, but also because at the time of writing, the issue 
remains live. It does, however, illustrate the diffi culties Parliament has in engaging 
in collective action on corporate issues. 
 The Palace of Westminster was designed in the 1830s but construction was only 
completed in the 1860s. 111 It was damaged during World War Two and rebuilt in 
the period 1945 – 50. Since then there has been no general renovation of the Palace, 
although there have been many incremental upgrades. Over time, the parliamen-
tary estate expanded to include a number of properties in and around Westmin-
ster. As noted earlier, control over the Palace shifted to Parliament over a period 
of 30 years. The Palace is now an iconic building, classed as a World Heritage site, 
under the control of the two Houses ’ authorities. It continues to accommodate 
many MPs and peers. 
 From the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, there were increasing concerns 
about the deteriorating physical state of the Palace. 112 In 2012, a study group estab-
lished by the two Houses ’ management boards published a pre-feasibility study 
and business case for the long-term maintenance of the Palace of Westminster. 113 
It stated bluntly that  ‘ If the Palace were not a listed building of the highest heritage 
value, its owners would probably be advised to demolish and rebuild [it], ’ 114 and 
 ‘ it is remarkable that it continues to function. ’ 115 
 In spite of this, two initial assumptions were made, which remain fundamental 
to this day. The fi rst was that the Palace had to remain as a central site for the 
work of Parliament. The second was that in carrying out R & R, the legislative and 
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political work of the two Houses should not be impeded, or as little as possible. 
With these in mind, the study set out a number of initial options, including 
continuing repairs and replacement over an indefi nite period of time; a rolling 
programme over a defi ned period of time; repairs and replacement in a shorter 
period of time, and with parliamentary activity shifted elsewhere. 
 Successive reports confi rmed the initial study ’ s fi ndings of a looming crisis. 
Following the pre-feasibility study, the Commons Commission and Lords ’ House 
Committee agreed to have an external review of the various options for the res-
toration and renewal of the Palace. An Independent Options Appraisal (IOA) 
Report was published in mid-2015. 116 The IOA Report set out the costs of a roll-
ing programme (minimal work, with Parliament occupied); a partial decant (the 
Commons then the Lords moving to temporary accommodation); and full decant 
(with both Houses vacating). Broad details of each are set out in  Table 1 below. 
 Table 4 .1:  The options for Restoration and Renewal of the Palace of Westminster 
 Projected time (years)  Projected cost  ( £ billion) 
 Rolling programme  32  5.7 
 Partial decant  11  3.9 – 4.4 
 Full decant  6  3.5 – 3.9 
 Source: Deloitte, AECON and H & K,  ‘ Palace of Westminster Restoration and Renewal Programme 
Independent Options Appraisal ’ — Final Report (2014) 10. 
 A Joint Committee was then appointed in late 2015 to consider the IOA and R & R 
project. It reported back in late 2016. 117 The Committee recommended that there 
was a  ‘ clear and pressing need ’ to carry out R & R, and that of the three options, a 
full decant was seen as the least disruptive and most cost-effective option overall. 118 
It also recommended the establishment of an arm ’ s length delivery authority, 
overseen by a sponsor board, to test the options and produce the fi nal detailed 
designs and business case. The Committee exhorted both Houses to make a decision 
on this as soon as possible. The Public Accounts Committee published a report 
supporting the recommendations of the Joint Committee, 119 but the Treasury 
Committee announced in early 2017 it would carry out an inquiry into the options 
examined by the Joint Committee. 120 And at the time of the announcement and 
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confi rmation of the general election in late April 2017, there had been no debate 
the Joint Committee ’ s report. Thus, there will be no consideration of R & R in the 
immediate future. 121 
 Two points emerge. First, the role of the Executive in this (and indeed in the 
history of House governance) is fundamental, but lacks transparency. So, for 
instance, the Treasury Committee ’ s queries on the costs of R & R were addressed to 
David Lidlington, the incumbent Leader of the Commons — not to the respective 
House Commissions. 122 It is unthinkable that the Government ’ s backing would 
not be required for such a major capital investment; and yet there is very little 
explicit public acknowledgement of this role. 
 The second point is that there is a history of parliamentary indecision over 
estates and accommodation: the construction of the Palace of Westminster; the 
acquisition of surrounding property for parliamentary use. It is no different here. 
Concerns over the Palace ’ s deteriorating state and its effect on the operations of 
Parliament have been voiced since at least 2000. The Commissions of the Houses 
have been slow in responding to this impending crisis over parliamentary infra-
structure; and, in spite of two independent reports and two separate select com-
mittee reports urging immediate action, the Houses and their governance bodies 
have so far failed to make any collective decision. At the very least, this failure to 
make a decision will increase the overall cost of implementation; but at its worst 
may result in a serious accident. 
 There is a common denominator linking both points together: the fear of 
negative publicity. No one wants to be seen to be taking the decision to spend so 
much money on essentially themselves. Although this chapter has eschewed the 
matter of members ’ pay, allowances and staffi ng, the parallels between the 2008 
expenses crisis and R & R are too marked to be ignored. The expenses crisis came 
about because of a long-term failure on the part of successive House of Commons 
administrations and the executive to address the cost of democratic governance in 
a transparent way for fear of how this would be interpreted by the media and the 
public. 123 Even when it became clear that the Freedom of Information Act applied 
to the Commons, there was great diffi culty securing collective agreement from key 
actors — the Commission (and particularly the Speaker), the Management Board, 
the Executive, and MPs themselves. It was only following the  Telegraph ’ s reportage 
on the non-redacted data on MPs ’ expenses that their hands were forced; and in 
fact the proposed  ‘ solution ’ (the establishment of the Independent Parliamentary 
Standards Authority) came not from the Commons, but the Executive. The 
reactive nature of parliamentary governance — and in particular the unwillingness 
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or inability of parliamentarians and key governance bodies to press the issue to 
resolution — threatens to cause yet another crisis in democratic governance. 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
 Our claim in this chapter has been that to understand how  ‘ Parliament ’ works, 
we should examine not just its external relationships with the other branches, but 
also its internal administrative structures and processes. We do not deny that the 
executive plays an important, even dominating, role in determining the scope and 
limits of legislative action. The argument is rather that even if there was no fusion 
between the executive and the legislature, the latter would still have serious issues 
in ensuring collective action. The need for consensus, the requirement of impar-
tiality, the intensely political environment of both Houses and concern about 
media scrutiny and public disapproval have been a recipe for inertia and inaction. 
 Of course, it is clear that in some respects  ‘ Parliament ’  has been able to act 
 ‘ collectively ’ . But we have to treat some examples of these with caution. In the 
passing of legislation, for instance, Parliament acts collectively, but this occurs 
primarily because of political parties, which aggregate political preferences. 124 
Select committees and procedural matters have not been addressed in this 
chapter, but there has clearly been an increase in what the late Anthony King 
called the  ‘ cross-party mode ’ in the growth and increasing sophistication of select 
committees; and in the establishment of the Backbench Business Committee. 125 
It is at least arguable, however, that much of this has occurred because of highly 
specifi c, exogenous circumstances. There are at least three conditions for successful 
 ‘ effi ciency ’ reforms (ie, reforms which benefi t the legislature rather than the 
executive): 126 a window of opportunity, usually at the beginning of a Parliament; 
a reform agenda; and leadership. 127 These may be necessary, but not suffi cient 
conditions. 128 This was certainly the case with the Wright reforms, which were a 
response to the 2008 expenses scandal. 
 Our examination of intra-branch relationships suggests that a signifi cant 
reason for Parliament ’ s sluggish nature is the lack of an accepted hierarchy 
or an identifi able, active leadership. The executive, in spite of its own endemic 
coordination problems, can rely on party cohesion and collective cabinet 
responsibility in the political context, and individual ministerial responsibility 
(which requires civil service loyalty) in the administrative context, to ensure a 
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unifi ed stance. The judiciary, too, has its own sources of cohesion and coordination 
resolution mechanisms: long immersion in the law; a very clear judicial hierarchy; 
and most recently, a strong judicial administrative organisation. 129 To put it another 
way: the executive and judiciary are strong relative to the legislature because they 
are unifi ed institutionally in a way that the legislature can only rarely be. 130 
 Rather than focusing on confl ict between branches, examining the  ‘ mundanity ’ 
of administration and internal issues of capacity may be an equally important way 
for us to evaluate the strengths and/or autonomy of each branch. What is striking, 
in examining the various governance reports of the Houses of Parliament, is the 
extent to which a driver of Parliament ’ s growing autonomy has been the need to 
work through everyday matters such as accommodation, estates and services. It is 
in responding these issues that the Houses have been forced to bolster their fi nan-
cial and management capacity, and to some extent work together in a more unifi ed 
manner. 131 These changes, as Winetrobe perceptively noted,  ‘ have not generally 
been motivated by questions of constitutional principle and propriety ’ . 132 The 
ground-breaking Ibbs Review, for instance, did not justify its recommendations in 
terms of the Commons ’ constitutional functions or roles; this was simply a matter 
of ensuring a public sector organisation followed standard business practice. It 
was only later that those tasked with governance reforms began to recognise the 
constitutional signifi cance of administrative issues. 133 Future students may wish to 
turn to issues such as estates security and the R & R programme to understand the 
weaknesses and strengths of the legislature rather than look to legislative clashes 
with the judiciary or the executive. 
 None of this suggests what the  ‘ proper ’ role or capacity of Parliament should 
be, or what is desirable. That question is far too complex to be dealt with in one 
chapter, for there are various competing values which underlie the governance of 
the legislature that require careful evaluation. The most obvious set of values is 
that between supporting the government (governing), and scrutinising its action 
and legislative proposals (accountability). But there is also a tension between the 
democratic value of representation — the need to accommodate and support the 
representatives of the constituencies and interests of the UK, and the value of 
organisational effi ciency — the administrative drive towards the provision of coor-
dinated, coherent institutional action. These values are not easily reconciled. 134 
But we should expect no less: confl ict is the central characteristic of all legislatures. 
